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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
ZACHERY SCOTT SHIPMAN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NO. 43632
KOOTENAI COUNTY
NO. CR 2014-1461
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Zachery Scott Shipman appeals from the district court’s order relinquishing
jurisdiction over him and executing his unified sentence of twenty years, with five years
fixed, for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen.

The district court relinquished

jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman because, inter alia, Mr. Shipman displayed “grooming
behavior” toward other offenders on his rider and because his static risk factors did not
change over the course of his rider. The district court abused its discretion in relying on
these two factors. The affection Mr. Shipman displayed toward other offenders on his
rider cannot properly be characterized as grooming behavior and Mr. Shipman could not
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have changed his static risk factors over the course of his rider as those factors are, by
definition, unchangeable.

This Court should vacate the district court’s order

relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman and remand this case to the district court for
a new jurisdictional review hearing.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Shipman rented a room in a family house, where he resided with a father and
his young son, from approximately September 1, 2012 to September 1, 2013. (R., p.15;
6/6/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.23-25.) In September 2013, the son, then five years old, disclosed to
his father that Mr. Shipman had touched him on his genital area multiple times.
(R., p.15.) Mr. Shipman was charged by criminal complaint with two counts of lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen, both pertaining to the same victim. (R., pp.20-21.)
A preliminary hearing was held on May 6, 2014, at which the young boy and his father
testified. (6/6/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.13-14.) The boy testified that he and Mr. Shipman touched
each other’s genital areas on multiple occasions with their clothes off. (6/6/14 Tr., p.24,
L.17 – p.25, L.4, p.25, Ls.12-17, p.28, Ls.3-16.) Following the hearing, the State filed
an Information charging Mr. Shipman with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen, all pertaining to the same victim. (R., pp.41-43.)
Mr. Shipman entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he
agreed to plead guilty to one count of lewd conduct and, in exchange, the State agreed
to dismiss the other counts and the parties agreed the underlying sentence would not
exceed twenty years, and the district court would retain jurisdiction. (R., p.84; 8/18/14
Tr., p.4, Ls.12-22.) The district court accepted Mr. Shipman’s guilty plea. (8/18/14
Tr., p.14, L.16 – p.15, L.10.) The district court sentenced Mr. Shipman to a unified term
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of twenty years, with ten years fixed, and retained jurisdiction for up to 365 days with the
recommendation that Mr. Shipman participate in a rider. (10/1/14, Tr., p.36, Ls.3-16.)
The judgment was entered on October 1, 2014. (R., pp.86-89.)
Mr. Shipman was placed on a sex offender rider at the North Idaho Correctional
Institution (“NICI”). (R., p.98.) On May 1, 2015, the NICI sent a letter to the district
court

and

an

Addendum

to

the

Presentence

Investigation

Report

(“APSI”)

recommending that the court relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman prior to the
completion of the period of retained jurisdiction. (Conf. Exs., p.61.) The district court
held a jurisdictional review hearing on May 21, 2015. (R., p.104.) At the hearing, the
State recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman and
execute the underlying sentence. (5/21/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-9.) Counsel for Mr. Shipman
recommended that Mr. Shipman be allowed to complete the rider. (5/21/15 Tr., p.22,
Ls.9-18.) The district court sent Mr. Shipman back on the rider. (5/21/15 Tr., p.32,
Ls.1-2; R., p.104.)
On September 8, 2015, the NICI sent a letter to the district court along with a
second APSI recommending that the court place Mr. Shipman on probation. (Conf.
Exs., p.77.) The district court held a jurisdictional review hearing on September 24,
2015.

(R., pp.107-07.)

At the hearing, counsel for Mr. Shipman requested that

Mr. Shipman be placed on probation and be allowed to transfer his probation via
interstate compact to the State of Texas.

(9/25/15 Tr., p.48, L.15 – p.50, L.1.)

Notwithstanding the NICI’s recommendation, the district court relinquished jurisdiction
over Mr. Shipman and executed his unified sentence of twenty years. (R., pp.109-10.)
The district court did, however, reduce the fixed portion of Mr. Shipman’s sentence from
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ten years to five years.

(R., pp.109-10.)

The order relinquishing jurisdiction over

Mr. Shipman was entered on September 24, 2015, and Mr. Shipman filed a timely
notice of appeal on October 2, 2015. (R., pp.109-14.)
On November 6, 2015, Mr. Shipman filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for reconsideration of sentence.

(R., pp.120-33.)

Following a

hearing, the district court granted Mr. Shipman’s Rule 35 motion and reduced the fixed
portion of his sentence from five years to four years.1
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Shipman and executed his sentence?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Shipman And Executed His Sentence
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction for an abuse
of discretion. See State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166 (2013); see also I.C. § 192601(4). “A court properly exercises its discretion when it (1) correctly perceives the
issue to be one of discretion, (2) acts within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it,
and (3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason.” Latneau, 154 Idaho at 166
(citation omitted).

The Clerk’s Record does not contain the district court’s order granting Mr. Shipman’s
Rule 35 motion. Simultaneously with the filing of this Brief, Mr. Shipman is filing a
Motion to Augment to include the district court’s order in the Record.

1
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The district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Shipman because it did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. The district
court relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman because of the “grooming behavior” he
displayed on his rider, because his static risk factors did not change over the course of
his rider, and because he “did a poor job of journaling daily.” (9/24/15 Tr., p.51, L.23 –
p.53, L.3.)

The first two reasons cannot support the district court’s decision and

Mr. Shipman’s poor journaling did not, in and of itself, warrant relinquishment.
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction
over Mr. Shipman and remand this case to the district court for a new jurisdictional
review hearing.
A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Shipman Based, In Part, On The “Grooming Behavior” He Displayed Toward
Other Offenders On His Rider
According to the NICI, Mr. Shipman displayed “grooming behavior” toward other

offenders on his rider.

The first APSI states that Mr. Shipman received a written

warning for resting his chin on another offender, which is a “grooming behavior,” and
received a formal disciplinary sanction for engaging in flirtatious behavior with another
offender.

(Conf. Exs., pp.63, 67.)

The first APSI describes Mr. Shipman as “a

significant disciplinary problem” because “he has shown repeated patterns of sexualized
grooming behavior[ ] with four (4) separate individuals that is directly related to the
pattern of behavior associated with the lewd conduct with a minor.” (PSI, pp.63-64.)
According to the second APSI, Mr. Shipman received an informal sanction after he was
placed back on his rider for “[g]rooming another offender” because he was seen walking
with that offender. (Conf. Exs., p.79.)
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Counsel for Mr. Shipman critiqued the characterization of Mr. Shipman’s
behavior towards other offenders on his rider as grooming behavior.

At the first

jurisdictional review hearing, counsel for Mr. Shipman argued:
They wrote him up for putting his chin on someone else’s shoulder. They
saw that as a grooming behavior, and it frustrates me to see these very
specific terms like grooming and predatory behavior being used
haphazardly in these reports because the idea, the concept of grooming is
very specific . . . . What we’re talking about here is not grooming
behavior. Flirtatiousness perhaps. We’re not talking about predatory
behavior.
(5/21/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.6-20.) Counsel for Mr. Shipman reiterated her concern at the
second jurisdictional review hearing:
You know, I took issue last time counsel [for the State] came in here
talking about grooming behaviors. It’s a very specific term, and this court
has had sex offender treatment providers who are well-versed in these
terms testify about what grooming means, and so to say that this was
ongoing grooming behavior because he’s walking around the retained
jurisdiction with the same offender I think is a misuse of that term.
(9/24/15 Tr., p.47, Ls.7-14.) Counsel for Mr. Shipman was correct. Mr. Shipman’s
display of interest, even arguably sexual interest, in other adult males on his rider, was
not grooming behavior.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that grooming behavior “is a pattern
of behavior intended to foster trust and remove defenses in order to prepare [a] child for
sexual abuse.” State v. Coleman, 152 Idaho 872, 878 (Ct. App. 2012). Mr. Shipman’s
behavior was not grooming behavior because he was interacting with other adults and
was not preparing any children for sexual abuse. Mr. Shipman was 26 years old at the
time of his sentencing and was unsure about his sexual orientation. (Conf. Ex., pp.2,
39.)

Mr. Shipman’s display of affection towards his adult peers was not grooming
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behavior and was certainly not “directly related to the pattern of behavior” of his offense,
as the NICI concluded. (Conf. Exs., p.64.)
The district court stated it did not “take any offense to [the prosecutor’s] using the
word grooming” because it was “used in the report” and was attributed to Mr. Shipman
in the report. (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.6-9.) The district court relied on Mr. Shipman’s socalled “grooming behavior” in deciding to relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman. The
district court specifically stated “that event”—referring to Mr. Shipman’s act of
conversing with another male offender on his rider, which was determined to be
grooming—gave the court “no confidence that [Mr. Shipman] would be able to turn it
around in the community.” (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, L.23 – p.53, L.2.) This was not a proper
basis for relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Shipman Based, In Part, On The Fact That Mr. Shipman’s Static Risk Factors
Did Not Change Over The Course Of His Rider
In deciding to relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman notwithstanding the

recommendation for probation contained in the second APSI, the district court relied in
part upon the fact that Mr. Shipman’s static risk factors did not change over the course
of his rider. The district court stated, “The STATIC-99 has gone nowhere; still at a
moderate to high risk to reoffend.” (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.5-6.) As an initial matter, there
was an error in the static risk factors, which should have resulted in Mr. Shipman being
a moderate risk rather than a high risk to reoffend.2 More importantly, the fact that

The first APSI includes a handwritten notation on the Sex Offender Risk Assessment
which states that the factor, “Ever Cohabitated with an Intimate Partner for more than 2
years” should not have been checked per the PSI and the psychosexual evaluation,
which should have resulted in a lower score. (Conf. Exs., p.69.) The same box is

2
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Mr. Shipman’s static risk factors did not change over the course of his rider was not a
proper basis for relinquishing jurisdiction.
At the second jurisdictional review hearing, counsel for Mr. Shipman correctly
pointed out that static risk factors do not generally change. Counsel said, “I just want to
ensure the Court understands that the static risk factors would not change once on the
retained [jurisdiction] because they’re immutable characteristics . . . so those factors
would not change over time and we would not see an improved score.

(9/25/15

Tr., p.51, L.24 to p.52, L.6.) The district court responded, “I understand that, but we’re
still at an assessed moderate to high level with conduct occurring in a controlled setting,
the grooming behavior, and going back after our meeting in May of this year and still
continuing in that behavior there . . . .” (9/24/15 Tr., p.55, Ls.7-11.) This quotation from
the district court reflects that it did not reach its decision to relinquish jurisdiction by an
exercise of discretion. The district court’s reliance on Mr. Shipman’s static risk factors—
and, specifically, the fact that those factors did not change over the course of his rider—
cannot provide a basis for the relinquishment of jurisdiction.
C.

Mr. Shipman’s Poor Journaling Did Not, In And Of Itself, Warrant Relinquishment
Notwithstanding Mr. Shipman’s so-called grooming behavior, the second APSI

reflects that Mr. Shipman did well on his rider and gained a meaningful understanding of
his offense.

The NICI recommended that the district court place Mr. Shipman on

probation based on his conduct on his rider. The second APSI states, “Mr. Shipman

checked—mistakenly—on the Sex Offender Risk Assessment included with the second
APSI. (Conf. Exs., p.84.) Notably, Mr. Shipman was determined in the psychosexual
evaluation to present only a moderate risk to reoffend. (Conf. Exs., pp.34, 41, 43.)
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demonstrated an ideal level of assertiveness and boundary setting in the later part of his
program that will likely lead to an increased chance of success on probation. He has
demonstrated an ideal ability to be amenable to treatment and supervision in the
community.” (Conf. Exs., p.82.) This recommendation is supported by Mr. Shipman’s
own evaluation of his rider.

He said, “For the most part what I learned is that I

committed a horrible crime and I will need to be aware of my thoughts and actions for
the rest of my life if I never want to hurt anyone again.” (Conf. Exs., p.80.) Mr. Shipman
recognized that his top triggers were babysitting, spending time alone with children, and
teaching children. (Conf. Exs., p.80.) And he began working on a plan to ensure that
he would never commit a sexual offense again. (Conf. Exs., p.80.)
The district court did not follow the recommendation contained in the second
APSI and did not place Mr. Shipman on probation. Instead, the district court executed
Mr. Shipman’s sentence, albeit with a reduction. The district court decided to relinquish
jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman for three reasons, two of which have been discussed in
detail above. The third reason the district court gave was the fact that Mr. Shipman “did
a poor job of journaling daily” and completed “only about thirty percent” of his journal
entries. (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.23-25.) This factor, standing alone, does not warrant
relinquishment.
This was Mr. Shipman’s first criminal offense. (Conf. Exs., p.8.) He had no
criminal history and passed a polygraph examination, in which he stated there were no
other victims. (Conf. Exs., pp.8, 42-43, 55.) The psychosexual evaluation concluded
that Mr. Shipman was both amenable to, and interested in pursuing, sex offender
treatment. (Conf. Exs., p.34.) In light of these factors, and discounting the “grooming

9

behavior” and lack of change in the static risk factors for the reasons discussed above,
Mr. Shipman’s poor journaling did not warrant relinquishment.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Shipman respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court’s order
relinquishing jurisdiction over him and remand this case to the district court for a new
jurisdictional review hearing.
DATED this 15th day of March, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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